India’s Fertility Rate Falls Below Replacement Level of 2 Children Per Woman; See Which States Have the Highest and Lowest Rates

India’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has fallen to 1.9 children per woman, taking the country below the replacement-level benchmark of 2.1 and marking a major shift in India’s demographic journey.

The latest figures from the Sample Registration System (SRS) Statistical Report 2024 show that fertility has declined dramatically over the past five decades, from 5.2 children per woman in 1971 to 3.6 in 1991 and 1.9 in 2024.

But the national average hides a striking divide between states. Bihar has the highest TFR at 2.9, while Delhi has the lowest at just 1.2, meaning fertility at the two ends of the country’s spectrum differs by more than two-fold. Only six major states covered in the data remain above the replacement level.

The figures point to an important change in India’s population story. The larger question is gradually shifting from how quickly the population is growing to how different parts of the country will deal with falling fertility, changing age structures and widely varying demographic trends.

What does a TFR of 1.9 actually mean?

Total Fertility Rate represents the average number of children a woman would have over her reproductive years if prevailing age-specific fertility rates continued.

A TFR of around 2.1 is generally considered the replacement level, the level at which one generation replaces itself in the absence of migration and allowing for mortality.

India’s TFR of 1.9 is therefore below that benchmark.

This does not mean India’s population will immediately start shrinking. Population changes happen over decades, and a country with a large young population can continue adding people even after fertility falls below replacement level because large numbers of people are entering or remain in their reproductive years.

What the SRS figures do show clearly is that the average Indian family has become substantially smaller.

The change has been particularly striking over the longer term. From 5.2 in 1971, the national TFR declined to 3.6 in 1991 and has now reached 1.9.

Even in the five years between 2019 and 2024, the national TFR declined from 2.1 to 1.9.

Rural India is at 2.1, urban India at just 1.5

One of the clearest differences in the SRS data is between rural and urban India.

The TFR in rural areas stands at 2.1, exactly at the replacement benchmark, compared with only 1.5 in urban areas.

The rural-urban difference is also visible in age-specific fertility patterns. Among women aged 15-19, the fertility rate is 13.0 in rural areas against 6.3 in urban areas. In the 25-29 age group, the corresponding figures are 149.4 and 107.5.

Marriage is taking place later as well.

The mean age at effective marriage for women has increased from 19.3 years in 1990 to 23.1 years in 2024. The current average is 22.6 years in rural India and 24.4 years in urban areas.

Together, the figures show how marriage patterns, education and broader social and economic changes are accompanying India’s decline in fertility.

Different States – Different Fertility Rates

The scale of India’s demographic divide becomes particularly clear when fertility rates are compared across states.

Bihar has the highest TFR at 2.9, well above both the national average of 1.9 and the replacement level of 2.1. The rural TFR in Bihar is even higher at 3.0, while its urban TFR stands at 2.3.

Bihar is followed by Uttar Pradesh at 2.6, with a rural TFR of 2.7 and urban TFR of 2.1.

Madhya Pradesh is at 2.4, Rajasthan at 2.3, while Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are both at 2.2.

These are the six major states that remain above the replacement level.

At the opposite end is Delhi, with India’s lowest TFR among the states and UTs covered in the comparison at just 1.2.

West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Kerala follow at 1.3 each.

Andhra Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Maharashtra and Punjab are at 1.4, while Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka and Telangana stand at 1.5.

Odisha is at 1.6, Gujarat and Uttarakhand at 1.7, while Assam and Haryana are at 1.9.

The difference between the two extremes is striking: Bihar’s TFR of 2.9 is more than twice Delhi’s 1.2.

The numbers show that India is not undergoing one uniform demographic transition. Different parts of the country are moving through it at markedly different speeds.

16 bigger states and UTs are now below replacement level

The balance has decisively shifted towards lower fertility.

A total of 16 bigger states and UTs covered by the SRS figures have a TFR below 2.1, compared with only six major states above it.

The below-replacement group stretches across different regions of the country, from Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir in the north to Gujarat in the west, West Bengal in the east and virtually all the major southern states.

This geographical spread is significant because low fertility is no longer confined to a handful of highly urbanised or southern states.

At the same time, the continued high fertility in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and some central and eastern states means national averages can obscure large regional differences.

Education and fertility show a striking relationship

One of the most revealing findings in the SRS data is the relationship between women’s education and fertility.

At the national level, the TFR among illiterate women is 3.2, compared with 1.8 among literate women.

The rate generally falls further as educational attainment increases.

Women with education below primary level have a TFR of 2.1. It falls to 2.0 among those educated to primary level, 1.9 at middle level, 1.8 among women educated to Class X and 1.7 among those educated to Class XII.

Among graduates and women with higher qualifications, the TFR is 1.6.

Bihar again provides a striking example. The TFR among illiterate women in the state is 4.2, compared with 2.8 among literate women.

The figures do not by themselves establish that education alone causes lower fertility, income, urbanisation, marriage age, access to contraception and several social factors can interact with educational attainment, but the association in the SRS data is clear.

Delhi records sharpest fertility decline over a decade

The decline has not occurred at the same pace everywhere.

Comparing average TFR during 2012-14 with 2022-24, India’s fertility rate declined by 17.4%.

The decline was greater in rural areas, at 19.2%, compared with 16.7% in urban areas.

Among the bigger states and UTs, Delhi recorded the sharpest fall at 29.4%, followed by Gujarat at 25% and Tamil Nadu at 23.5%.

At the other end, Bihar recorded the smallest decline at 9.4%, followed by Chhattisgarh at 11.5%. Himachal Pradesh and Punjab each registered declines of 11.8%.

This is another indication of the widening demographic differences within India. Some states that already have low fertility are continuing to record substantial declines, while fertility is falling more slowly in some of the states where it remains relatively high.

India’s birth and infant mortality rates have also fallen

Fertility is not the only demographic indicator changing.

India’s Crude Birth Rate (CBR) declined from 19.7 in 2019 to 18.3 in 2024, while the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) fell from 30 to 24 deaths per 1,000 live births during the same period.

The Crude Death Rate stands at 6.4, compared with 14.9 in 1971.

An IMR of 24, however, means that approximately one in every 42 babies born alive still dies before reaching the age of one, showing that improvements in demographic indicators do not eliminate continuing public-health challenges.

Rural infant mortality also remains higher, with the data translating to roughly one infant death for every 37 live births.

Smaller families increasingly becoming the norm

The composition of births provides another indication of the change taking place inside Indian households.

According to the SRS findings, 66.4% of live births are first-order births, while only 3.5% are fourth-order or higher births.

The Gross Reproduction Rate (GRR), which measures the average number of daughters a woman would give birth to under prevailing fertility patterns, stands nationally at 0.9.

It is 1.0 in rural India and 0.7 in urban India.

Here too, Bihar and Delhi occupy opposite ends of the spectrum. The GRR ranges from 1.3 in Bihar to 0.6 in Delhi, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal.

From 5.2 children to 1.9 in five decades

The longer-term numbers perhaps best illustrate the scale of India’s transformation.

In 1971, the average TFR was 5.2. By 1991, it had fallen to 3.6. It stood at 2.1 in 2019 and has now reached 1.9.

India has therefore moved from a country where women had, on average, more than five children to one where the average is fewer than two.

The latest numbers also come at a time when the 15-59 age group accounts for 66.4% of India’s population, giving the country a large working-age base.

But demographic changes unfold over generations. Persistently lower fertility eventually means smaller cohorts of children, followed later by smaller groups entering colleges and the workforce, while older age groups can form a larger share of the population.

The timing and extent of those changes will not be the same everywhere because today’s fertility rates differ so sharply across states.

India’s demographic challenge is becoming more complex

For decades, India’s population debate was largely centred on high fertility and rapid population growth. The SRS 2024 numbers show why that discussion is becoming more complicated.

At the national level, fertility is already below replacement level. But India is not experiencing this transition uniformly.

Bihar remains at 2.9, while Delhi is at 1.2. Uttar Pradesh is at 2.6, while Maharashtra is at 1.4. Rural India remains at replacement level, while urban India is already at 1.5.

This means India could increasingly face two demographic realities at the same time: some states will continue to have relatively young and growing populations, while states that have sustained very low fertility could eventually see faster population ageing and slower growth in their younger population.

India still has a large working-age population. According to the SRS data, people aged 15-59 account for 66.4% of the population, providing the country with a substantial working-age base.

But fertility changes work slowly. Children not being born today translate into smaller cohorts entering schools first, followed later by colleges and the workforce, and eventually into changes in the balance between working-age and older populations.

That makes the fall to 1.9 more than another statistical milestone.

After more than five decades in which India’s fertility rate fell from 5.2 children per woman to 1.9, the country’s demographic debate is entering a new phase, one in which the challenge will increasingly be to understand not simply how many Indians there are, but where they live, how old they are, and how dramatically population trends differ from one state to another.